This paper was submitted in December 2008 for publication in Orient und Okzident: Antagonismus oder Konstrukt?, the proceedings of a conference held in Würzburg in April 2008. Final proofs were corrected in May 2012. It has now (July 2013) been announced that the volume will not be published. It remains to be seen whether publication of the complete volume can be undertaken by a different press or individual items will have to appear in separate locations. Whatever the outcome, the present contribution will be published in some form, but in the meantime it I feel entitled to post it here.

For the time being, the paper (below) can be referred to as:

The Military Dimension of Hellenistic Kingship:
An Achaemenid Inheritance?

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Introduction
In a paper presented in Athens in 2006 I argued that, although the Seleucid idea of ruling Anatolia and Western Asia from a Syro-Mesopotamian centre and through a largely Greco-Macedonian ethno-classe dominante is hard to imagine without the Achaemenid project of ruling a similar area from an Irano-Mesopotamian centre through a largely Persian ethno-classe dominante and although Seleucid stress on Macedonian identity might be said to echo Achaemenid stress on Persian identity, the interest lies in the differences between the two dispensations.1 In that paper I devoted only a few lines to the military dimension and, when the invitation to Würzburg came, I thought it might be worth exploring it further, especially in view of the imminent release of the Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Warfare. In the event that volume offers little and the topic reveals few unsuspected oriental gifts to Hellenistic culture. Still, some reflections on the Achaemenid and Hellenistic military worlds and, more generally, on conjunctions between Iranians and the practice or meaning of warfare in the Hellenistic environment may contain points of interest. Given the importance of war in the Hellenistic world, even a negative conclusion is valuable, for it reveals a notable part of the cultural canvas in which orient could not influence occident.2

Alexander conquered the Achaemenid Empire, but he did not eliminate Persian polities. Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia and Commagene all had rulers who claimed connection with Achaemenid dispensation via descent from Darius' helpers or the Achaemenid dynasty itself. Atropatene claimed continuity from the Iranian satrap installed after Alexander's death. There was a revivified independent state in Persis from the early II c., and a new Iranian polity in shape of Parthians from the mid-III. But these are not a primary object of concern: any

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2 I am very grateful to Nick Sekunda for his comments on a draft of this paper. Neither he nor any other third party should be held responsible for any inadequacies that remain.
Achaemenid heritage, would not be surprising – though specifically Achaemenid links are not, in fact, always what you notice first: contemplating the images of Commagenian or Armenian rulers with their distinctive headdress one is as conscious of dissimilarity as its reverse. Stephen Mitchell recently sketched the north Anatolian kingdom eventually ruled by Mithridates the Great in strongly Achaemenid colours and played down the extent of Hellenisation. Perhaps that is right, despite the political attempt to win Anatolian Greek hearts and minds. But the Parthians were not immune to Hellenism: Greek documents from Parthian Susa are a striking monument of the Hellenistic East. So too is the entirely Greek coin-iconography of the first autonomous ruler in post-Seleucid Persis (Vadfradad I). But the cultural effects here are contrary to those with which we are concerned here. For our purposes the question is whether co-existence of Iranian polities and Greco-Macedonian kingdoms increased the chance that the latter might tap into an Achaemenid heritage. There will be something to record of this sort – but not much.

Persian Wars
One way in which the conjunction of "Persia" and "war" had an impact was in the continuing status of the "Persian Wars". This was a world in which Aristion's ambassadors to Sulla in 87 spoke about Theseus, Eumolpus and the Persian Wars and Athenians (Plutarch Sulla 13) and Spartans decided leadership of the Eleutheria procession at Plataea by formally debating which state contributed more to the defeat of Xerxes. It also accommodated more or less implicit allusions to 480-479. The Chremonides decree assimilates Antigonus Gonatas to the Persian threat (IG ii 687 = SIG 434/5) and Ptolemy II associated his conflict with the Antigonids with Alexander's attack on Persia. The source behind Diodorus XXI cast Lysimachus' attack on the Thracian Dromichaetes in the mould of Xerxes' on Greece (Diodorus 21,12). Above all Celtic incursions into Greece and Anatolia were seen as a new Persian invasion. An interesting aspect of this is Polybius' justification for narrating Roman wars with north Italian Celts (2,35):

I consider that the writers who chronicled and handed down the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no small contribution to the struggle of the Greeks for their common freedom. For there is no one whom hosts of men or abundance of arms or vast resources could frighten into abandoning his last hope, that is to fight to the end for his country and fatherland, if he kept before his eyes what part the unexpected played in those events and bore in mind how many myriads of men, what determined courage and what armaments were brought to nothing by the resolve and power of those who faced the danger with intelligence and calculation.

He adds that the fact that Greeks have been alarmed by the prospect of Gallic invasion in his own lifetime was a motive for writing the account. This goes beyond marking the importance of the Gauls by equating them with Persians; both events are equal contributors to Greek consciousness-raising. Though it is Romans who defeat Celts in Polybius II, raised Greek consciousness of liberty in the second c. BC could in principle have a Roman target; and ironies of that sort are characteristic of this discourse. Antiochus III was (in his own eyes) defender of

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6 Chaniotis o.c. (n.4) 160. 172. 191. 220-221.
Greece against Roman Persians (Livy 35,17) or (in the eyes of Rhodians and Romans) a quasi-Achaemenid invader. Mithridates VI dedicated weapons at Delphi and Nemea at the start of an attempt to free Greece from Romans – an imitation of Alexander at Ilium and suggestion that his own invasion of Greece matched Alexander's of Anatolia, both being a defence of Greeks against the barbarian: yet Mithridates bore a Persian name and claimed Achaemenid descent. Even more piquantly Polyaeus (7,35,1) has Brennus show fellow-Gauls small and scruffily dressed prisoners to encourage them to despise Greeks: one recalls Agesilaus displaying naked, white-skinned Persian prisoners for the same purpose here Brennus = Agesilaus and Greeks = Persians, and Celtic/Persian assimilation has been turned on its head. None of this has much bearing on the reality of Hellenistic warfare; but the Persian Wars, which did so much to create classical Greece, had not lost their hold on perceptions of reality; and as the Hellenistic era was created by a defeat of Persia, this is hardly surprising.

The prevalence of war(s)
From past wars as a reference point for current conflict, I move to current conflict itself. Did warfare play a comparable part in the experience of the rulers and subjects of Hellenistic and Achaemenid eras?

War was endemic in the Hellenistic era: Leveque claimed there were only 18 years of peace between 323 and 150. There are apparent dormant periods in Achaemenid record, for example in 512-500 or for some 20 years before 424. But after 424 there is always war or the active expectation of it, and, although the abiding problem of Achaemenid historiography (that western regions are better covered than central and eastern ones) is not without Hellenistic analogue, the overall evidence base for Achaemenid history is probably slightly worse and dormant periods should not persuade us of any overall difference in the prevalence of war. Slightly trickier is the question of war conducted by the king in person. Of 456 Achaemenid military events, some 81 are under direct royal command and only 22 are post-479. That 5 of those 22 are only known from entries in Late Babylonian Astronomical Tablets is a warning about arguments from silence and no Achaemenid king is never recorded as having led an army, but some aspects of this overall record may seem to belong in a different world from that of the diadochs and their successors. Other aspects do not, however, and our imprecise knowledge of both environments makes it unwise to assert a fundamental difference in royal military inactivity.

7 e.g. Liv.33,20; Flor.1,24,12; Plut.Flamm.11. See Tuplin o.c. (n.1) 125 n.37.
8 App.Mithr.112 (549).
9 Xen.Hell.3,4,19; Ag.1,28.
10 P. Levêque, La guerre à l’époque hellénistique, in J.-P. Vernant (ed.), Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce (Paris 1968) 261-287, at 218. Chaniotis o.c. (n.4) 5 illustrates the point in a different way by selecting kingdoms or regions. Not for nothing was the strategos the characteristic high official of the Hellenistic era: A. Aymard, Esprit militaire et administration hellénistique, REA 55, 1953, 132-145, at 143.
11 Though in the latter case we do know of minor interventions by the Sardis satrap in east Aegean Greek affairs.
12 This is assisted in the fourth century by the repeated attempts to reconquer Egypt.
13 These figures come from an unpublished catalogue of events involving the military forces of the Achaemenid empire prepared in the context of an ongoing study of the military dimension of Achaemenid history.
Hellenistic historians sometimes distinguish between Big War and Little War, between the wars of kings or dynasts and local conflicts, e.g. between Anatolian cities.\textsuperscript{15} To some extent this is a contrast between the grand narrative of historiographical sources and events encountered in epigraphical documents, although this is probably exacerbated by the poor survival of historiographical sources: the war of Selge and Pednelissus enters Polybius' narrative (5,72-76) because the Pednelissans sought help from Achaeus but is in itself a local affair, and if the 220s were represented historiographically only by the fragmentary record that is normal for Hellenistic history we probably not have heard of it. Still, there was certainly much essentially local conflict within the geographical space ranged over by Hellenistic kings, some of it not directly with or involving the agencies of a relevant kingdom. Was there a similar pattern in the Achaemenid dispensation? I make three observations.

(1) One form of local Achaemenid period fighting is systemic conflict between satraps and e.g. Pisidians, Mysians or Bithynians.\textsuperscript{16} But this was conflict with what was effectively extra-imperial land, and any conflicts between different groups within these areas was not part of Achaemenid history

(2) Another sort of Little War involves protection against pirates or bandits. Xenophon's vision of the Achaemenid military machine ascribes its local forces the role of protecting agricultural land and we see a reflection of this in the final chapter of \textit{Anabasis}.\textsuperscript{17} The image of a policed landscape has some resonance with Hellenistic documentary formulae that note forts as a standard part of a landscape\textsuperscript{18} and the frequency with which forts appear in less stereotyped contexts.\textsuperscript{19} Such places may even explicitly be said to serve as protection for agriculture. But this is mostly evidence about civic territory, so there is no direct parallel or historical link: the phenomenon is the latest version of the city's long-established need to secure its land, and one can hardly even be sure how much the fort, as visible architectural category, is a novelty in fact as distinct from documentation. Forts existed in non-civic territory too and may even be on Achaemenid sites, but we rarely (if ever) know this and any heritage here is rather banal. Perhaps the Macedonians who conquered Asia did find a landscape that was garrisoned, fortified or militarized in a way not true of Macedonia or Balkan Greece and thus inherited an Achaemenid model: that is the sense of John Ma's comparison between the final chapter of Xenophon's \textit{Anabasis} and the various troops on show in the famous third-century Smyrna-Magnesia treaty (OGIS 229).\textsuperscript{20} But I cannot say I feel very sure about this. I would add that we can hardly attempt for the Achaemenid era the sort of discussion of interaction between garrison troops and locals that Angelos Chaniotis has recently offered,\textsuperscript{21} but the effect of Hellenistic


\textsuperscript{16} e.g. Xen.An.1,1,11; 1,2,1; 1,6,7; 1,9,14; 2,5,13; 3,1,9; 3,2,23; Mem.3,5,26; Hell.3,1,2.

\textsuperscript{17} Xen.Oec.4,4-25; An.7,8,8-23.

\textsuperscript{18} e.g. OGIS 229,67; SEG 43,707; SIG\textsuperscript{3} 360,2-4. 7-11. 18-22; SIG\textsuperscript{3} 633,39; Staatsverträge 525; IC Lato 5.

\textsuperscript{19} Ma o.c. (n.15) 341-3. 349; Chaniotis o.c. (n.4) 28-9. 47


\textsuperscript{21} A. Chaniotis, Foreign soldiers – native girls? Constructing and crossing boundaries in
mercenary mobility upon dissemination of Greek cults is not quite the same as the long-term prominence of Anaitis in some west Anatolia regions consequent upon Achaemenid military settlement and there is a similar imperfect parallel between the local provision of food for Hellenistic mercenaries billeted in private dwellings and the system for feeding what may be Carian soldiers in Achaemenid Borsippa recently illuminated by Caroline Waerzeggers. It would be surprising if such systematisation of the major road network as there had been in Achaemenid times disappeared without trace: Alexander’s bematists (FGH 119-123) and (perhaps) the activities of Antimenes. Seleucid milestones in Iran and evidence about the Ptolemaic post system duly indicate otherwise. Unfortunately, a specifically military component (e.g. rapid transit of field armies; the regular guarding and patrolling of roads) is not particularly conspicuous in the explicit data.

(3) Hellenistic conflicts involving Greek cities concern polities whose relationship to royal power often differed somewhat from that of Anatolian Greek cities during the total of 111 years when they were firmly within the Achaemenid Empire. Indeed, what we know of dispute resolution privileges arbitration: that is what Artaphernes instituted after the Ionian Revolt, and we have documentary evidence of Persian satrapal involvement in an arbitration a century later. For something slightly different we might look to the mid-4th c. alliance of Heraclea and Sinope: this envisages reciprocal assistance in local conflicts to which the King is not party. But the relation of north coast Anatolian cities to Achaemenid authority was perhaps slightly looser than elsewhere: I find such a text hard to imagine in fourth century Ionia. So do others: Rhodes and Osborne in their commentary on the defensive alliance between Erythrae and Hermias of Atarneus identify the envisaged enemy as the Persian King. Further north, when Cius honours Athenodorus there is no need to postulate events lying outside a narrative directly involving the satrapal authorities; and Cyzicus’ 362/1 war with Proconnesus was with a

22 Chaniotis o.c. (n.4) 149-154.
29 i.e. c.540-499, 494-479, 386-334.
30 Hdt.6,42, and cf. the attitude attributed to Mardonius in 7,9β.
31 RO 16 = Tod 113 = SIG3 134.
32 I.Sinope 1.
33 RO 68 = Tod 165 = SIG3 229 = I.Erythrai – I.Klazomenai 9 = I.Adamyttium 45.
34 Tod 149.
state (just) outside Achaemenid territory. At the other end of western Anatolia Mausolan military actions were definitely part of a satrapal agenda, while the endemic and iconographically celebrated warfare of Lycia (again) marks an area with a problematic relation to the Achaemenid state. In these cases for a Hellenistic parallel one might do better to think of the Anatolian dynastai – but that takes us into a different politico-military category from the "Little War" with which we started. Chaniotis speaks of power-vacuums as prompting local conflict: in the Achaemenid realm one sees that phenomenon at a high level in the crisis caused by the rebellion of Bardiya in 522, but (for example) the Satraps' Revolt of the 360s and 350s cannot easily be shown to produce similar more local results among Anatolian communities; that may be one reason for down-grading the Satraps' Revolt as a historical phenomenon, but the silence about Hellenistic-style "Little War" remains.

Relevant here is the inappropriateness to an Achaemenid context not only of formal royal donations of military matériel to Greek cities but also of the sort of king-city discourse discussed in John Ma's book on Antiochus III; that discourse reflects the relative militarization of cities and their acknowledged capacity to cause a King trouble. Perhaps, if we had the right evidence, we might find that the younger Cyrus, with whom so many Ionian cities were allegedly so much in love, developed such a discourse. The circumstances in which he confronted the area were those of an attempt at Persian re-conquest that differed in type from that of 499-494: without robust deployment of primary military resources, it was a piecemeal process, producing unstable results and involving manipulation of geographically external powers. No Achaemenid king ever dealt directly with such a situation, but Cyrus was in principle a close approximation. However, the stage at which there is most stress on Cyrus' good relations with the cities is that at which he is planning rebellion – and the King's target had been and remained the cities' unequivocal re-incorporation as tribute-paying subjects.

Royal attitude to war: military kingship?
Laurianne Sève-Martinez recently proposed that Achaemenids played the warrior-king more strongly than Seleucids. Is that true? Were other Hellenistic Kings different? One can try to decide by examining patterns of behaviour, verbal articulations and iconographic representation. (The latter two categories may impede objective access to the first and command a larger part of the discussion.) Hellenistic Kingdoms were certainly created by military action. Legitimacy depended on one's own and one's predecessors’ military conquest. Moreover external and internal boundaries were sufficiently unstable to make a military ideology necessary: in a world

35 Dem.50,5.
36 o.c. (n.4) 71.
38 Chaniotis o.c. (n.4) 68.
39 J. Ma, Antiochus III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor (Oxford 1999) esp. 179-242. Note also Chaniotis o.c. (n.4) 67 on the fine example of 'the principles of reciprocity and the theatricality that governed the negotiations between a king and his subjects’ provided by Eumenes’ letter to the people of Tyriaeum.
40 Xen.An.1,1,5-8; 1,9,7-12.
41 L. Sève-Martinez, Quoi de neuf sur le royaume séleucide?, in F. Prost (ed.), L’Orient méditerranéen de la mort d’Alexandre aux campagnes de Pompée. Cités et royaumes à l’époque hellénistique (Rennes 2003) 221-244, at 240: “on constate le caractère guerrier de la dynastie séleucide, mais rien n’indique que les rois aient cherché à se présenter comme des guerriers, à l’image des Achéménides”.
in which even cities had military colour (cf. above n.15), kings could hardly not. Their origins lay in a land where weapons had gone on being deposited in graves long after the practice ceased in Greece, and there was never a chance they would respond positively to Ashoka's message of Buddhist non-violence. Some of this applies to Achaemenids in principle. We shall have to see whether there is a significant difference in actual projection or non-projection of military values.

So far as patterns of behaviour go, I comment on just three matters. First, it is often said that Hellenistic royal dress was military dress. I am not quite happy about this (did Kings wear breastplates at banquets?) and the claim is perhaps no more than that there was no fundamentally different type of clothing that marked a king: a king could go to war by putting armour on over his usual clothing. Achaemenid kings had two dress-codes available, a "Median" riding costume and a "Persian" robe: Greek imagination generally conceived him in the former (thus, incidentally, rejecting the temptation to talk about effeminisation of garb), Persian monuments show him in the latter. Neither is incompatible with weaponry, so one could say that the Achaemenid king is as much or little a military figure in non-battlefield dress as his Hellenistic counterpart. Second, did he go to the battlefield as often? I have already noted that it would be unwise to assert that he did not. But some Hellenistic rulers spent more time with an army (not just bodyguards) close at hand than some Achaemenid rulers, and the diplomatic phrase in which "king, friends and army" is almost a formula for the royal state with which Greek cities must deal is hard to imagine in an Achaemenid context. That is a matter of language, but also perhaps of reality – the same reality in which the army is a body that can authorize Seleucus I's division of his kingdom (Appian Syriaca 61). The history of the early years of Antiochus III is dominated by the question of which war to fight next, and for Ma the entire reign was a sort of permanent "armed patrol" that does not ring true for Achaemenid kings. Third, when they got to a battlefield did they act differently? Seleucid kings fought personally and in dangerous places – ten died in battle and others were wounded. Only one case of each is known in the Achaemenid record. More generally the Hellenistic stories of personal engagement and bravery – in a broadly Macedonian / Alexandrian tradition – have

42 F. Canali de Rossi, Iscrizioni dell estremo oriente greco (Bonn 2004) nos.291-292.
43 M. Austin, Hellenistic kings, war, and the economy, CQ 36, 1986, 450-466, at 456.
44 C. J. Tuplin, Treacherous hearts and upright tiaras, in id. (ed.), Persian Responses: Political and cultural Interaction with(in) the Achaemenid empire (Swansea) 68-97, esp. 79-80.
45 The formula is found in narrative mode in e.g. Polyb.5,50,9; I Macc.6,28.57-62: 23,43.
46 The fact that OP kara can mean both “people” and “army” does not, I think, affect this observation.
47 M. Austin, Krieg und Kultur im Seleukidenreich, in K. Brodersen, Zwischen West und Ost (Hamburg 2000) 129-166, at 133.
50 OGIS 220 (Ilion) = I.Ilion 34 (Antiochus I); Polyb.10,49 (Antiochus III in Bactria).
51 Hdt.1,214; Ctes. 688 F9(7-8) (death of Cyrus); Xen.An.1,8,26; Diod.14,23,6; Plut.Artox.11 = Ctes.688 F20 (wound of Artaxerxes II).
52 App.Syr.55 (Seleucus v. Nicanor); Diod.18,30-32; Plut.Eum.7 (Eumenes v. Neoptolemus); Plut.Pyrh.7, 24 (Pyrhus v. Pantauches and an anonymous Mamertine); Diod.22,10,3 (Pyrhus at Eryx); Diod.19,30,3,9 (Antigonus and Eumenes); Diod.18,33-34 (Ptolemy at Fort of Camels); Diod.19,81-84 (Demetrius at Gaza); Diod.20,52,1-2 (Demetrius at Salamis); Polyb.10,31,49 (Antiochus III in Hyrcania and Bactria); Polyb.4,78,8 (Philip V at Alipheira); Polyb.5,82,5-86,6
rather few Achaemenid analogues: there is, of course, a significant danger of false argument from silence here, but the complete absence of personal action by Artaxerxes III in the triumphant re-conquest of Egypt in 343 strikes an un-Hellenistic note. Artaxerxes II did provide firm leadership during a disastrous retreat from humiliating defeat in Cadusia – but we know that because Plutarch (Artoxerxes 25) made a nice ethical point out of it, not (necessarily) because it is in any useful sense more “typical”. The contrast between Achaemenid kings characteristically at the centre of a battle-array and Hellenistic ones characteristically on an attacking wing is perhaps symbolic.

Next, verbal articulation. Most contemporary non-literary utterance (publicly displayed or archival and documentary) casts no light at all, but there are various royal or quasi-royal utterances that might be useful. From the Achaemenid Empire we have royal inscriptions, mostly from the heartland, written in Old Persian, Elamite and Akkadian, formulated as utterances of the King and conforming to an essentially single stereotype, but occasionally from other areas and composed alternatively or additionally according to different local models (and not always as ego-utterances); the occasion of such texts is sometimes celebration of victory but much more often, at least ostensibly, the marking of a building project. From the Hellenistic era we chiefly have Royal Correspondence, ad rem rescripts in a variety of political contexts – a category that existed in Achaemenid times, though no incontestably authentic example survives. In the present context it matters little as the material throws scant light on the king-as-warrior; the Hellenistic material, in particular, is systematically fails to address such issues because of its focus on administrative issues and its wish to engage with city-communities in a rhetoric of cooperation and benevolence (a wish that the cities reciprocated). When Antigonus speaks of giving up part of “an ambition upon which he had spent much money and not a little effort” (Staatsverträge 428) we get only the faintest echo of any politico-military ideology underpinning the re-unification of Alexander's empire; and when cities reply to kings they are not inclined to reveal much of the reality or rhetoric of royal militarism. The only location for anything at all reminiscent of the Achaemenid material is in a number of Ptolemaic documents in which royal military exploits are celebrated at varying length and in varying amounts of detail. Most are priestly documents (often synodal decrees). But the Adulis text is technically a secular (and extravagant, though still brief) boast of military victory and the narrative in the Gurob papyrus could have been the first step towards construction of a celebratory royal discourse. Perhaps this Ptolemaic bias is just an accident of survival (we only have the Adulis text because Cosmas Indicopleustes copied it in late antiquity) and Antioch or Seleucia-ad-Tigrim were once full of Seleucid self-praise. Or perhaps Greek and Egyptian traditions created an Alexandrian pharaoh with different habits from those of more down-to-earth Seleucids. Günther Hölbl has said the Adulis text reads like praise of an 18th Dynasty pharaoh. The Seleucids, by contrast, were not men much given to intellectual culture: the Antiochene library was not nearly a celebrated as the

53 In the case of the Behistun text there was also an Aramaic version.
54 Even soldiers praising a king may end up highlighting his piety, mildness and magnanimity, not his military prowess (Choix 18).
55 A list of such decrees appears in W. Huss, Die in ptolemaischer Zeit verfassten Synodal-Dekreten der ägyptischen Priester, ZPE 88, 1991, 189-208. See also W. Clarysse, Ptolemée et temples, in D.Labelle – J.Leclant (eds.), Le décret de Memphis (Paris 2000) 41-65. Items with relevant content include the Pithom, Canopus, Raphia and Mendes stelae, the Rosetta Stone and the Philae and Year 23 decrees.
Alexandrian or Pergamene ones.\textsuperscript{58} Perhaps that affects modes of self-representation – without, of course, precluding the reality of Seleucid militarism. Indeed, their supposed anti- or non-intellectualism is sometimes seen as the mark of blunt soldiers, and one writer who is associated with a Seleucid king is Daimachus, author of a work on siege-warfare.\textsuperscript{59} The general sense of royal success underpinned by divine favour was, of course, one shared between Persian and Greek rulers; when a text from Ilion (32) speaks of divine support for Antiochus I’s restoration of the empire it is not a million miles from Darius’ presentation of things in the Behistun narrative.\textsuperscript{60} But the theology of the Achaemenid king’s peculiar relationship with Ahuramazda and the cosmic order he created is lacking.\textsuperscript{61} The Seleucid connection with Apollo and other Macedonians’ talk of Heracles and Zeus as ancestors are different, and I am not sure they can even be said serve an equivalent function in a different cultural setting. There are, perhaps, echoes of the cosmic environment in some of the Ptolemaic material mentioned above, but only because that reflects an indigenous tradition – synodal decrees are a context in which the king is incorporated into the political agenda and world-view of the Egyptian religious establishment. Another quite different indigenous tradition with religious content is seen in the careful note that Ptolemies campaigning in Coele Syria repatriated divine statues and the like allegedly stolen by the Persians,\textsuperscript{62} in the Canopus decree this is stressed to the virtual exclusion of any narrative of a campaign that other texts (including the Adulis decree) claimed led to the conquest of virtually the whole of Asia, though (admittedly) the Raphia decree gets a rather better balance when dealing with the defeat of Antiochus in 217.

Darius’ assertion of royal virtues in his tomb inscription speaks \textit{inter alia} of what he achieves in palace and battle, his ability as a fighter and his skill (on horseback and foot) with spear and bow.\textsuperscript{63} These all come after more ethical virtues (justice, support of truth, self-control and so forth). There is a generic similarity with the rehearsal of Ptolemaic virtue in the Satrap, Pithom or Mendes Stelae, which includes military abilities, though with varying degrees of stress. The simpler phrasing and first-person formulation give Darius’ text a sharper rhetorical impact, but overall it is hard to be sure which of the kings invested more in the appearance of being a warrior.

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\textsuperscript{58} Its existence is attested only in the report (Suda s.v. \textit{Euphoriōn}) that Euphorion was librarian there in Antiochus III’s time. If Aratus earlier used its resources when “correcting Homer” (\textit{Vita Arati}; cf. R. Pfeiffer, \textit{History of Classical Scholarship} I [Oxford 1968] 120-121), the results do not seem to have entered the scholarly mainstream.

\textsuperscript{59} Chaniotis o.c. (n.4) 98. The predominantly architectural cultural (and calculatingly euergetic) ambitions of Antiochus IV (cf. G. Downey, \textit{A History of Antioch in Syria} [Princeton 1961] 95-106) do not, I think, much affect the general point.


\textsuperscript{62} DNb §2f-h. For (OP) text see R. Schmitt, \textit{The Old Persian Inscriptions of Naqsh-i Rustam and Persepolis} (London 2000). French translation in Lecoq o.c. (n.60).
The Satrap Stele calls Ptolemy "young"; there are other signs of a valuation of youth and beauty among Hellenistic rulers, but not in the Achaemenid realm. Darius and Xerxes were young when they became king and Cyrus would have been had he defeated Artaxerxes at Cunaxa. The actual age of Cyrus the founder is opaque; but the stories leave one with a feeling of youth (and that is certainly the case in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*). But there is no evidence that youth was promoted as an aspect of the royal image: the heavily bearded figures of the Behistun, Persepolis and Naqš-i Rustam reliefs buy into a different model. There was, according to Greek sources, a discourse about royal stature (which is reflected in iconography) and physical beauty (which does not seem to be). Claims that Darius I had very long arms and Artaxerxes I one arm longer than the other – hardly entirely consonant with the suggestion of physical perfection – might perhaps be explained as deliberate misunderstanding of metaphorical statements about the kings' great reach, i.e. power. Or perhaps that is how Persians would have rationalised what were actually physical imperfections. We are told by Plutarch (*Moralia* 172E) that Cyrus' hook nose ensured that hook noses were considered the height of beauty among the Persians. Greeks and Persians would have agreed that a ruler should be strong and physically capable (which means militarily capable) but it is likely that the accident of Alexander's youth affected Hellenistic royal image-making in a way without analogue in the Achaemenid realm.

One verbal feature of Persian royal inscriptions is the royal titulary: that is not a Hellenistic feature in Greek (as opposed to Babylonian) environments, but two connected points arise. (1) Seleucus I and II were labelled Nicator and Callinicus – perhaps only belatedly and as an aspect of ruler-cult (an entirely un-Achaemenid context), but this is still a celebration of military success (which other Hellenistic cognomina tend to avoid) and perhaps a reflection of heightened military consciousness in the time of Antiochus III. (2) Antiochus is also pertinent to the one Achaemenid title with a Greco-Macedonian afterlife, that of "Great King". Ptolemaic use of the title followed an invasion of Babylonia and the extravagant claim to have conquered most of Asia; Antiochus III's use follows a variably successful (but much hyped) foray into the lands beyond Media and a subsequent anti-Ptolemaic campaign in Coele Syria in 200. So, Hellenistic war and the Achaemenids perhaps come together here, with a specific type of military success prompting thoughts of the old empire. Moreover in Antiochus' case, at least, this arose after quite prolonged exposure to the vast spaces of the Iranian plateau: even the scanty remnants of Polybius' narrative contain two explicit allusions to the Achaemenid dispensation – a description of Ecbatana, the "residence of the Medes" (10,27), and of the Achaemenid tax-breaks that stimulated the construction of North Iranian *qanats* (10,28). Perhaps there was once more of this sort of thing. At the same time, we cannot prove the Achaemenid title (as distinct from the Alexander-style quasi-cognomen "Great") was used until a direct military response to the Ptolemies had occurred in the Levant: Ptolemy III's earlier arrogation of it is part of Antiochus' reason for following suit. There is no plain sign that in post-200 disputes about territory in Anatolia Antiochus adduced the Achaemenid dispensation as a

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64 Chaniotis o.c. (n.4) 46. Compare the assertion that Eumenes was *glaphuros kai neoprepēs* (Plut.Eum.11).

65 That a text of Nabonidus referring to Cyrus' defeat of the Medes (P.-A. Beaulieu, *The Reign of King Nabonidus* [Yale 1987] 107-8) calls Cyrus the 'young servant of Marduk' is not, of course, a counter-indication.


68 cf. Tuplin o.c. (n.1) 119.
ground of legitimacy. Rather it was his enemies that articulated the assimilation. There were limits to the Seleucid conqueror's desire to be "the Great King".

Another feature of Darius' tomb-inscription is the statement that the pictures of subject peoples show the Persian Man's spear has gone far and the Persian Man has repulsed the enemy far from Persia. This use of the spear as a symbol of military power has been thought to recur in Hellenistic contexts: scholars cite the Boscoreale fresco, (very) occasional coin images, the idea that kings were sometimes represented as heroic figures leaning on spears, poetic texts that label various Ptolemies as spear-men, Theophrastus' (contrary) supposition that a true king is made by sceptre not spear, and (perhaps above all) the idea of spear-won territory. Greco-Macedonians and Persians could certainly agree that the spear was a military weapon par excellence, but that the former were inheriting anything from the latter is not very convincing. "Spear-won" was part of the verbal currency of contested absolute ownership in fourth century Greek politics (including contestations with Macedon) and had no special connection with Persia. Deeper associations (both of this concept and of doru- compound words and indeed of the spear as symbol) are, if anything, with Homer – which should be taken seriously in view of Alexander's Homerism and Ptolemaic Alexandrism. (Johannes Haubhold's recent claim that Xerxes used the Trojan Wars against Greeks and Alexander's visit to Troy was in part a response to that complicates but does not eliminate the distinction. Another recent perspective is just as important – that of John Lendon to the effect that the Hellenistic world saw an interplay of technical military training and a continuing respect for Homeric notions of battle. The entitlement of Alexander and his successors to Asiatic lands did rest on winning-with-the-spear – it is a defining feature of the Hellenistic world. But the new owners absolutely did not need to steal anything from the verbal armoury of their enemies in order to express the situation in the aggressive sound-bite "spear-won".

In the category of verbal articulation we must also briefly consider contemporary philosophical or literary utterance. One strand of Hellenistic kingship theory was uninterested in war. These texts highlight the king's relationship to god and to law, assert ethical values (self-
control, moderation, philanthropy etc.), and tend to suggest the king’s aim should be peace and justice, not war and conquest. The attempt to reconcile autocracy and Hellenic morality or the community-virtues of the polis is plain: as Oswyn Murray recently said, the philosophers’ function was to turn crude military monarchy into something acceptable to Greek opinion.79 There was also an alternative view. Epicurus thought philosophers should avoid royal courts and kings should talk about military matters (which were their real business) not intellectual culture (which was not). Persaeus saw court conversation as a matter of sex not syllogisms.80 A well-known Suda entry (s.v. basileia) declares that it is neither nature nor justice which gives monarchies to men but the ability to command and army and handle affairs competently, and a famous conversation between Cineas and Pyrrhus underlines that king’s unwillingness to abandon the prospect of future wars in favour of enjoying the fruits of past ones (Plutarch Pyrrhus 14). Elsewhere Polybius declares praxis kai tolmē polemikē the most important of Philip V’s kingly qualities (4,77,3).

There is no equivalent Achaemenid period discourse – nothing produced by "intellectuals" belonging to something like the kings’ own ethno-cultural-linguistic group; the magi did not write peri basileias and what Assyro-Babylonian scholars did was cast royal horoscopes, not analyse the nature of royal power. Greek observers of a philosophical cast of mind, on the other hand, pictured the empire as, whatever else it might be, an entity with military tendencies.81 So did Herodotus: his vision of Achaemenid kings is of military conquerors obeying an imperative to extend the empire – even to the ends of the earth (7,8γ). That is perhaps a genuine Achaemenid idea, but (whatever the case with Alexander82) it is not a Hellenistic one. We do find Ptolemy II allegedly wanting to preserve the paternal inheritance and add something thereto (Theocritus 17,105-6) or the Smyrniots boasting of helping to increase the kingdom of Seleucus II (OGIS 229) – but this is fairly banal; Thucydides ascribes such ideas to Alcibiades (6,18); Athenian ephebes swore to pass on the city greater than they received it,83 and even Calymnians had an obligation to maintain and increase their territory. 84

A claim to rule the earth persisted in Persian texts. But after 479 there is no plain example of attempted new conquest.85 The borders of the game of Hellenistic royal politics and warfare were essentially those of Alexander’s Empire, so in one sense conflicts between kingdoms are about rearrangement, not expansion, and (at least after the diadoch period) easily take on the air of reconquest. But there are some marginal expansions (Pyrrhus in Italy; Ptolemaic interest in the Red Sea; the engagement of Antiochus III with East Anatolian Iranian

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80 Epicurus: Plut.Mor.1095C. Persaeus: Athen.162B. 607B.
81 This is what we find in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia or in Plato’s Laws.
82 See Horning (this volume).
83 RO 88.
84 Staatsverträge 525 = Tit.Cal., Testimonia, no.xii 26-27.
85 There may have been marginal examples. The royal wars against the Cadusians might come to mind here, but in truth they can only rationally be seen as campaigns against people who are already theoretically subjects. Darius II in 405/4 is said to be fighting against "rebels" (Xen.Hell. 2,1,13). There is a Cadusian arkhon fighting alongside Artaxerxes II at Cunaxa, and killed by Cyrus; Plut.Artox. 9.14. And Ctesias’ view was that Cyrus Elder had put an end to the long history of Cadusian failure to obey Medes: F5 = Diod.2,33,6. Xenophon assumes them as subjects in Cyropaedia.
polities\textsuperscript{86}) and, since the Diadochi were, even within the bounds of the old empire, asserting their personal control of territory in a context in which their right to that control had to be fought for, they were in a real sense conquerors, and both they and their successors are likely to have regarded attempts to vary the status quo at any given juncture as exercises in extending their realm. The avoidance of titular territoriality (the fact that the Hellenistic King is King PN, not PN king of such-and-such an area) might be thought to tell against this – if there is no formal home territory there can be no clearly defined extension of it. But one can also see non-territoriality as reflecting a permanent, if not always explicit, ambition for expansion. The idea of stable boundaries is alien to Hellenistic kingship, so even recovery of land previously held by an ancestor could readily have the allure of new acquisition. There would be a tension, of course, between seeing such an event as the righting of a historical wrong and celebrating it as proactive and successful aggression. But (for example) the outcome of the latest round of Seleucid-Ptolemaic competition over Coele Syria (a competition the author of Daniel 11 sees almost as a permanent backdrop of history – the prophetic analogue to the modern historian’s perception of a world without stable frontiers) is a different thing from Artaxerxes II recovering western Anatolia in 386 or Artaxerxes III reconquering Egypt in 343. The conquest imperative may have been stronger in Hellenistic kings than in at least the Achaemenids who immediately preceded them.\textsuperscript{87}

After words, pictures: what does iconography say of military kingship? The Achaemenids are notorious for underplaying this in the large-scale public art of the imperial heartland. It is true that one of the most familiar Persian imperial icons are the glazed-brick archer-spearmen from Susa; there must once have been many such on the palace walls, and Persepolis was littered with their equivalents (we can currently document over a 1000), which in original painted form will have been as colourful as the Susa figures – and slightly more varied, since riding-costume as well as robes appeared. These were not soldier-free environments iconographically (or presumably in reality). But they are battle-free ones, and it is customary to say that the intention was to project harmonious co-operation rather than military action: the effect of the latter is seen through images of supportive subjects (even weapon-carrying ones) not of violent conquest. In the larger scheme of things (taking in the works of Anatolian sculptors, seal-cutters and coin-makers) military and even battle imagery is not entirely absent, but there is an issue about the extent to which this represents royal ideology and there may be a danger of making too much of it as a sign of warrior ideology on anyone’s part. In short it does not seem that the Achaemenid imperial state was very concerned to project a military component in its identity in visual form.

In this respect Hellenistic kings appear little different. Michel Austin declares that coins have military themes,\textsuperscript{88} but the incidence seems small: outside Bactria, the kings are rarely accoutred as warriors and the number of other images of weapons or weapon-bearing persons is limited.\textsuperscript{89} Occasional elephants on Seleucid coins celebrate a form of military technology, but I doubt the horned horse is an allusion to their cavalry or the armed Athena of Ptolemaic and Seleucid coins counts as an aggressive symbol of military power. Some monarchs did use

\textsuperscript{86} See Engels (this volume).

\textsuperscript{87} One may recall Gehrke’s observation (H.-J. Gehrke, Der siegreiche König. Überlegungen zur hellenistischen Monarchie, AKG 64, 1982, 247-277, at 276) that, with Hellenistic kings, one should not be wondering why they went to war but asking why they did not.

\textsuperscript{88} Austin o.c. (n.43) 456

\textsuperscript{89} Some, moreover, are on bronze-issues, hardly an ideologically heavy-weight medium. – Ptolemy II appears once on a cameo (along with Arsinoe) wearing a helmet: Hölbl o.c. (57) 37 fig.2.1.
Victory types (following Alexander's example) – alluding to success in war, indeed, but doing so with a symbolic, quasi-divine and non-violent icon. There is little attempt to use coin portraits to ascribe to monarchs an aggressive or threatening personality: on Seleucid coins the forceful visage of Seleucus I gives way to something variously seen as heroic, reserved or "gaudente"; Smith speaks of the mannered and quiet image of the middle Ptolemies.\(^{90}\) Other media (so far as now accessible) have little to offer. Known battle-paintings are strongly associated with Alexander and the Persians; paintings of Antigonus (IG ii\(^2\) 677) and the Pergamenes (Pausanias 1.4.6) fighting the Gauls trade on the same association. The painting of Agathocles' cavalry battle mentioned by Cicero (II Verrines 4.122) probably involved Carthaginians. Depiction of fighting between Greco-Macedonians in was in fact almost taboo. A suggestive exception is provided by stelae carrying the Egyptian priestly synodal decree of summer 217: a horse-back Ptolemy is shown defeating Antiochus; in one version he is dressed in Macedonian style, but in others his garb is Egyptian, and in all Antiochus is depicted in a fashion proper to the entirely Egyptian iconographic environment of the monuments.\(^{91}\) A clash between Hellenistic kings thus looks like the victory of Greek over barbarian or of barbarian over barbarian and, for any Hellenic viewer, the proprieties are preserved. (A similar phenomenon is actually to be found in Achaemenid material, where the battle-scenes on seal-stones pit Persians against visually and culturally distinct opponents.) Victory-monuments – potential equivalents of Darius' Behistun relief – are very rare: the grandiose exceptions provided by the Attalids in Pergamum, Athens and (probably) Delphi related to the defeat of barbarians, operated in a mythological or symbolic mode – and famously achieved a curious heroisation of the vanquished enemy. Sensibilities other than that of crude militarism are to the fore here. If it is true that Antiochus marked the destruction of Achaicus by commissioning a statue of Apollo and Marsyas,\(^{92}\) that is another, appropriately more gruesome, example of symbolic monumentalization. On the other hand, Philip V’s Delian victory monument (two victory dedications in front of a stoa) seems not very far removed from the established Greek practice of displaying spoils in a Panhellenic sanctuary and, although single-mindedly self-congratulatory in its exclusion of any reference to his allies, perhaps does not represent a decisively new royal contribution to celebration of military prowess.\(^{93}\) A number of royal equestrian statues are known from written sources, though rarely with any indication about armament, and an over-life-size *agalma* of a non-equestrian armed figure of Attalus III was

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\(^{90}\) Tuplin o.c. (n.1) 118; R. R. R. Smith, Hellenistic Royal Portraits (Oxford 1988) 112.

\(^{91}\) See D. J. Thompson, Memphis under the Ptolemies (Cambridge 1988) plate 6; Hölbl o.c. (n.57) 163. Antiochus’ Egyptian appearance is of a piece with the notable fact that the Egyptian text gives him the title “pharaoh”, puts his name in a cartouche, accompanied by a divine determinative and appends the “life, prosperity, health” acclamation (cf. G. Vittmann, “Feinde” in den ptolömisch SYNÓDΛDEKRE一同 Chen, in H. Felber [ed.], Feinde und Aufrührer. Konzepte von Gegnerschaft in ägyptischen Texten besonders der Mittleren Reiches [Leipzig 2005] 198-219, at 199-201). We do not see an Egyptian Ptolemy defeating a Greco-Macedonian Antiochus and perhaps it was felt we should not *read* of such a thing either.

\(^{92}\) R. Fleischer, Marsyas und Achaicus, JÖAI 50, 1972-1975, Beiblatt 103-122.

\(^{93}\) See K. Bringmann – H. von Steuben, Schenkungen hellenistischer Herrscher an griechischen Städten und Heiligtümer (Berlin 1995) 198-202 (KNr 136-138); K. Bringmann, Geben und Nehmen. Monarchische Wohltätigkeit und Selbstdarstellung im Zeitalter des Hellenismus (Berlin 2000) 64-78, esp. 76-78. It is unclear to me whether we are to assume the stoa was reserved for display of spoils or pictures, as is apparently taken to be the case in Attalus’ stoa at Delphi.
decreed on one occasion. But another, perhaps more common, model was the nude figure, sometimes leaning on a spear – a way of masking any hint of militarism behind a culturally acceptable veneer of heroic symbolism: in general, kings are more often assimilated to gods than shown as warriors. It has been suggested that cuirassed statues in bronze are for technical reasons greatly under-represented among the marble copies through which we mostly access Hellenistic royal statues and that some surviving portrait heads may have been intended for insertion into separately made armed torsos. That might be true, but the amount of indirect evidence that Hellenistic public spaces were awash with warrior-kings does still seem remarkably small.

In short, I am far from sure that Sève-Martinez’s view about the greater militarism of Achaemenid kings is correct. But I am also unsure that the relationship should be reversed. It looks to me as if both Achaemenid and Hellenistic rulers soft-pedalled the military representation of power. But their reasons were different: for Achaemenids a sense of divine ordinance privileged outcome over process (god is beneficent, royal activity is part of the cosmic order, and achievement is formulaically easy); for Alexander’s successors the mores of Hellenic culture imposed constraints. Outlandish display was possible; but in Ptolemy II’s great procession the military forces came at the back, behind the allusively symbolic floats devoted to the gods that were the principal attraction. Antiochus IV’s Daphne extravaganza (Polybius 30.25-26) was a special event, surely inter alia a defiant response to the “barbarian” triumph of Romans; and Attalus’ monuments were unaccompanied by acres of self-congratulatory text. There was always the nagging sense that, at least among the ethno-classe dominante, kings should play the civic and civilian ruler. One notes that the military component in surviving poetic praise of kings tends to be rather modest.

One final observation under this heading takes us back to religion. The outlandish occasions just mentioned illustrate the fact that Hellenistic kings could make a display of themselves, not least in contexts of military success, by celebration of religious festivals or the architectural adornment of religious sanctuaries. We cannot tell whether Achaemenid kings might do the same. Mithridates VI once marked victory over the Romans with a grand sacrificial feast for Zeus Stratios, the procedure of which followed the ancestral tradition of Achaemenid Kings. Wouter Henkelman has suggested that some such festal event can be identified in the Persepolis Fortification archive – but there is no visible or necessary link to the military dimension and no sense in which the procedure is intrinsically military. Given the theology of Achaemenid kingship, one assumes that Achaemenid kings thanked their god(s) publicly for victory, but we cannot say that they did so in ceremonies that laid any more stress on the means of achieving that victory than did their royal inscriptions.

94 OGIS 332 = Inschrift. Pergamon 249.
95 Smith o.c. (p.90) plates 1a, 1b.
97 See Rice o.c. (n.5).
98 For various views see e.g. J. G. Bunge, Die Feiern Antiochos IV Epiphanes in Daphne im Herbst 166 v.Chr., Chiron 6, 1976, 53-71; E. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley 1984) 76; N. Sekunda, Hellenistic Infantry Reform of the 160s (Lodz 2001), 150-158 (who rightly insists that such an event may have multiple explanations).
99 App.Mithr.66 (276-9).
Military practice: the composition of armies

From the representation of war, I move its actual conduct. More specifically, what was the character and composition of Achaemenid and Hellenistic armies? Did the components of Hellenistic, especially Seleucid, armies owe anything to an Achaemenid background? (I concentrate on the Seleucids because the relevant area of recruitment most closely resembles that of the Achaemenids. 101) Hellenistic armies that gleamed with gold had brought an element of oriental opulence into military practice. Was there more to it than that?

So far as the presence of tactically or technically distinct troop categories is concerned, one can say that broadly speaking Hellenistic armies fielded by the major players in Asia resemble Achaemenid period ones in having higher proportions of cavalry to infantry than the 1:10 that was the rule-of-thumb of classical mainland Greece. 102 In that respect Asia experience reinforced Macedonian tendencies. Some Hellenistic novelties come from nowhere near an Achaemenid background, for example the Celtic thureos-shield or the recruitment of non-Greco-Macedonians as Macedonian-style infantry or the arms-race-like development of warships. Others are more tantalising. Indian elephants appeared in Darius' army at Gaugamela (e.g. Arrian Anabasis 3,11,6) but were a much less regular feature of Achaemenid armies than of Hellenistic ones. Despite the association of early Achaemenids with primitive siege-technology 103 and perhaps even ballistic weaponry, 104 the siege machines of Hellenistic armies certainly descend from fourth century Greek developments. The appearance of cataphracts in Seleucid armies after Antiochus III's anabasis does represent Iranian influence – but it is

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101 One peculiarity of the Ptolemaic evidence deserves brief mention, viz. the appearance of people labelled Persai (tēs epigonēs) in documents from the third century and later. Various explanations have been essayed to cover the phenomena (which include special tax status and a tendency to have Greek names), and these explanations sometimes have a military colour, e.g. that they descended from Iranian military settlers of the Persian period – a doubtful category – or even from Persian mēlophoroi who accompanied Alexander's body to Egypt (N. G. L. Hammond, Alexander’s use of non-European troops, BASP 33, 1996, 99-109, at 108-109). But the truth is that these people are very unlikely to represent a real Achaemenid legacy to the Ptolemaic military landscape and, if they have a military association at all, it is as likely to be as descendants of Greek settlers/soldiers in Persian-dominated Egypt. For further discussion and references cf. W. Clarysse, Greeks and Persians in a bilingual census list, EVO 17 (1994), 69-77; C. S. La’da, Who were those “of the epigone”? Akten des 21. Internationalen Papyrologenkongress (Stuttgart–Leipzig 1997), 563-9; W. Clarysse –D. J. Thompson, Counting the People in Hellenistic Egypt (Cambridge 2006) 157-9.

102 To say this one has to discount some Achaemenid cases in which Greek sources assign such fantastical figures to the infantry that the proportion of cavalry falls below even 1:20 and some Hellenistic cases in which special conditions interfered (transport to Cyprus or mainland Greece; eastern unrest at time of Raphia).

103 Siege mounds: Hdt.1,162; 1,168. Mining: Hdt.4,200; 5,115; 6,18; Polyaen.7,11,5.

104 Undefined sophismata and/or mēkhana: Hdt.3,152; 6,18.

Relevant material is reviewed in P. Briant, À propos du boulet de Phocée,REA 96, 1994, 111-114, I. Pouguet-Pedarros, L’apparition des premiers engins balistiques dans le monde grec et hellénisé: un état de la question, REA 102, 2000, 5-26. See also A. Kuhrt, A note on the excavations in the Tash K’irman oasis, ARTA 2002.02 (www. achemenet.com/ressources/enligne/arta). The alternative explanation of apparent catapult ammunition from late sixth and early fifth century sites from Paphos and Phocaea is that the stones were intended to be dropped or rolled onto attackers: A.W. Lawrence, Greek Aims in Fortification (Oxford 1979) 40.
Parthian, not Achaemenid. (The partly armoured cavalry of the Achaemenid era may be part of the cultural background to the cataphract, but that is a different matter.) In fact, the sole piece of undoubted Achaemenid technology in Hellenistic armies is the scythed-chariot – a weapon used rarely and with no more success than in the Achaemenid period.

When one turns to the ethnic composition of armies things are trickier. Sherwin-White and Kuhrt insisted that the Seleucid army was not simply dependent upon Greco-Macedonians and that Iranians played a substantial role. All who have studied Alexander know that the issue of including Iranians in the army was a live one at the end of the conqueror’s life, though all will also know that historians dispute the extent and nature of this inclusion and that the issue was certainly very contentious in 323. Whatever Alexander had in mind, there is no guarantee that the Hellenistic situation is a neat development thereof: we certainly cannot make an accurate trace of the later destination of Alexander’s oriental troops far enough after 323 to work out any usefully specific continuities. There are few detailed accounts of the composition of Seleucid armies, but they do reveal that various contingents with ethnic labels were present – by my reckoning 26, of which 8 belong to land beyond the Zagros. (The armies of Eumenes and Antigonus in their final showdown in Iran add a few more: but they never recur in other contexts and contribute nothing to the discussion – except, of course, to underline the willingness of Greco-Macedonian diadochs to use Iranians, where possible or necessary.) The few detailed accounts of Seleucid armies include even fewer that provide proper statistics, but these do not favour the view that people labelled as from beyond the Zagros are a numerically significant proportion – this is true even if one adds in the 1000 Cardaces at Raphia (Polybius 5,79,11), a group whose name reproduces that of a mysterious element in the later Achaemenid army.

Two further questions follow. Are there other ways in which Iranians contributed to the Seleucid army? And is the multi-ethnicity of Seleucid armies similar in character to that of Achaemenid armies?

Other generic evidence of an Iranian presence in Seleucid armies is limited to a Zoroastrian temple near Antioch, a story in which a Seleucid army besieging Damascus celebrates a Persikē heortē (Polyaenus 4,15) and three putative Seleucid army-commanders with Iranian names. So we have to ask how far Iranians made it into the infantry or cavalry ranks of Seleucid armies. It is likely that infantry described as “equipped in Macedonian manner”, especially those said to be pantodapoi, include non-Macedonians, but perusal of the modern literature suggests a lack of any rational basis for determining how many and who these people were. Sherwin-White – Kuhrt declare OGIS 229 evidence for Iranians in the phalanx, which

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105 Polyb.16,18; 30,25; Liv.35,48; 37,40.
109 An Aribazus in Sardis (Polyb.7,17,18; 8,21) and in Cilicia (FGrH 260); Omanes at Palaemagnesia (OGIS 229).
110 Diod.18,29; 18,30; 19,14; 19,27; 19,40; Polyb.5,79,82; Liv.37,40.
(formally speaking) it is not. Billows says there must have been lots of "Greeks, Asians and others" among the non-Macedonian "Macedonians", but attempts little further definition. Bar-Kochva thinks there were Iranians in the Anatolian bit of the "Macedonian" army-core – Iranians who might even be descendants of Achaemenid-period settlers in the region (though he is not very clear about that) – but, as the Anatolian contribution was under 20% of Seleucid infantry resources, we cannot judge the Iranian part of great import.

Is cavalry a different matter? Polybius claimed that all of Asia got horses from Media, though horses and horsemen are not necessarily the same things. Seleucus I certainly acquired much Median and Persian cavalry after his defeat of Nicanor (Diodorus 19.91-92), but the sources provide no narrative historical continuity between that and the developed Seleucid military system. The only labelled Iranian cavalry are the 1000-strong *agēma* at Magnesia drawn from Media and its region (Livy 37.40.5-6). some mercenary Dahan hippotoxotai on the same occasion (37.38.3, 40.8) and the Nisaeans in the Daphne parade (Polybius 30,25), who might actually be non-Iranians equipped in Iranian style, but could still count as an Iranian element – though, as there are only 1000 of them, still a modest one. So once again, as with the infantry, we are reduced to wondering how many ethnically unlabeled cavalry might be Iranian. Bar-Kochva describes the cavalry drawn (as he sees it) from military settlers as "predominantly" Iranian, but "predominantly" turns out only to mean a little more than half (4500-5000 as against 4000 drawn from Mesopotamia, North Syria and Anatolia). Perhaps, in the context of a Greco-Macedonian kingdom, this does count as a striking result – and even a sort of Achaemenid inheritance – but I have to say that it strikes me above all as a guess.

Equally difficult (at least) is forming a view about the way in which large-scale Seleucid and Achaemenid armies "represented" the empires of which they were the defenders. Ma claims that "the variegated armies fielded by the Seleucids...were manifestations of the 'imagined empire'". Similar things have been said of some Achaemenid armies. Is there a genuine similarity here? Seleucid armies consisted of (1) "Macedonian" infantry (some, but not necessarily many, of whom may have been of non-Macedonian ethnic origin), (2) cavalry of unstated origin that are not so plainly said to conform to a Macedonian model (and will latterly to some extent turn into cataphracts) but for parts of whom traditional Macedonian titles like *agema* and companion cavalry are used, and (3) ethnically labelled contingents, some subjects, others mercenary. So multi-ethnicity was not related uniformly to the multi-ethnicity of the kingdom (and some groups came from outside its boundaries). Moreover the indigenous population of core Syrian and Mesopotamian regions is never explicitly visible. So the multi-ethnicity is not only non-uniform but also incomplete. Leaving mercenaries aside (a dimension

112 o.c. (n.107) 55.
114 17% on the figures at B. Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army (Cambridge 1976) 43.
115 5,44,7; cf. 10,27.
116 The *agēma* at Daphne (which has no ethnic label in Polybius) may also in fact be Median: so e.g.Sekunda o.c. (n.106) 22.
118 o.c. (n.49) 45.
120 This is assuming with Bar-Kochva o.c. (n.49) 69 that Syrians in the *regia ala* at Magnesia were Greco-Macedonian settlers in Syria.
of Hellenistic warfare preceded but not determined by Achaemenid use of mercenaries), what we have is a "professional" army of phalanx and cavalry drawn from a military settler population located across the kingdom alongside subject contingents characteristically drawn from peripheral regions (Asia Minor; Iran) and supplying other categories of troops (e.g. light-armed or slingers) – people whose presence is dictated by military speciality as much as ethnic identity. In a way all of the kingdom is represented, but it is not a homogeneous picture and there is a real sense in which the "imagined empire" is one of dominant Greco-Macedonians. It is true, and remarkable, that those who represent that dominant group may in fact be ethnically diverse, but if we judge it terms of cultural transfer we readily see that it is not a question of alien groups contributing their own thing to the Seleucid cultural banquet but of their being absorbed into a Greco-Macedonian world.

At first sight the Achaemenid army seems to represent a different model. Readers of the Herodotean army list or the roster of Darius III's army at Gaugamela (based on captured Persian documents) will find ethnic contingents representing pretty much every part of the available empire, a more restricted range in 331 than 480, of course, but representing the fullest possible call on resources. Much vaguer statements are made elsewhere about campaign armies gathered from all parts of the empire, and that seems to have been Artaxerxes II's intention at Cunaxa, where the mostly anonymous troops that arrived in time are drawn up kata ethne (Xenophon Anabasis 1,8,9). But this is not the whole story. Firstly, no one believes that all the ethnic units in Herodotus' list were actually deployed in Greece, and the range that can be proved to have been is really rather limited. So there may be a tension between a "virtual" imperial army and military reality. Secondly, the model at Gaugamela has to be contrasted with the odd situation encountered at Issus. There are two sources: they do not entirely cohere and neither wholly conforms to the nations-of-all-the-empire model. First, Curtius (3,2,9) implies full ethnic mobilisation was the intended model observing that eastern peoples were absent because of the rapidity of mobilisation; but the army mustered in Babylonia and fought in northern Syria – so where are the people from Elam, Babylonia, Mesopotamia and Coele-Syria, all later present at Gaugamela? Darius appears to have elected to fight with an army drawn only from Armenia and the Iranian plateau. Second, Arrian (2,8,8), while speaking of part of the army being drawn up kata ethne, provides no ethnic labels but does introduce an apparently different sort of group, 60,000 of "the so-called Kardakes" (2,8,6). Their only other appearance in an Achaemenid period narrative is as the dominant component alongside a large range of Anatolian groups in an army group commanded by Autophradates and drawn from forces assembled in the Levant in the late 370s for an invasion of Egypt (Nepos Datames 8). It is possible that they are a category of troops recruited across the empire and trained in uniform Persian manner; if so, they become strangely reminiscent of the core professionals of the Seleucid army: there is (of course) no continuity and when the term itself turns up twice in relation to Seleucid Anatolia, it is hard to know exactly what it signifies, but momentarily at least there would turn out to be more analogy between Seleucid and Achaemenid settings than would normally be thought the case. But it is also possible that Autophradates' and Darius'...
Kardakes were simply a special subgroup of troops that would normally just be labelled "Persian". In that case neither source on Issus takes us away from the normal assembly-of-ethnic-contingents model, though we are still left with the failure to make the army as ethnically representative as it could have been. We come back to the tension between the army-as-virtual-empire and the (perhaps normal) reality of major Achaemenid campaign armies being mostly composed – as Xerxes' army really was – of troops or troop-types proper to the imperial heartland and its eastern extensions. It should not be forgotten that some troops of that sort might actually be found in other parts of the empire, because of a form of military settlement. So, by a different route, we again get an analogy between Achaemenid and Seleucid conditions. How significant this is depends on the scale of such settlement and in particular how much it goes beyond the satrapal maintenance of Iranian cavalry forces – the sort of non-mercenary troops that, of course, dominate the satrapal resistance to Alexander at Granicus.

**Concluding remarks**

Granicus was, in a way, the opening conflict of the Hellenistic world and a suitable cue for bringing this discourse to an end. It was an event that nicely encapsulates that sense of general similarity and detailed difference between the Achaemenid and post-Alexandrian dispensations that has appeared persistently in the thoughts presented here. When Antiochus III's emissary speaks of the Iranian plateau troops he can bring to bear against Rome (Livy 35.48), we seem to be contending an exotic military world, an amalgam of east and west. Antiochus' enemies were happy to stress the east – as a way of damning and despising him. But the truth was on the whole more mundane. Rather than rehearsing that further, let me end with three final items. First, during the battle of Cunaxa Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes met up in the camp of Cyrus' army. Hellenistic observers would expect them to take the opportunity to sequester the baggage and use it as a means of blackmailing the undefeated Greek mercenaries; but they do no such thing. Mercenaries are already a widespread phenomenon, but the tactical consequences have not yet been worked out. Second, one reads sometimes that Hellenistic soldiers swore an oath by the King's fortune that derived from the Iranian concept of royal khvarnah. The oath is attested only twice, in Pontus (which is an Iranian environment) and at Smyrna (which mostly is not). General arguments for tyche as a Greek equivalent of khwarneh in Achaemenid contexts are weak. I suspect the royal tyche comes from the same stable as Eutychides' tyche of Antioch and that, as with later Parthian use of a Greek tyche on coins, we are dealing with Hellenic influence on the orient, not vice versa. Third, at a battle between Attalus and the Celts, pre-battle mantic sacrifices are carried out for the Pergamene ruler (Polyaenus 4.20). This is very unusual in narratives of Hellenistic warfare. We hear of it (a) because the diviner was a Chaldaean called Sudines and (b) the entrails were cunningly doctored so that an encouraging message in Greek appeared to have been written upon them. A strange tale in which the traditional specialist skill of reading the physical signs is sidelined and the specialist involved is not Greek. Do we note that a Babylonian is being employed by a Hellenised Anatolian to

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124 Xen.An.1,10,2-5,8; 2,3,19; Diod.14,24,3.  
125 Pontus: Strab.12,3,31. Smyrna: OGIS 229. Here Omanes and his Persians are only one element of a larger and (so far as we can tell or reasonably assume) non-Iranian setting  
126 cf. Tuplin o.c. (n.1) 121.  
127 The prayer in Antiochus I's Borsippa cylinder ‘may my good fortune be in your [sc. Nabu’s] pure mouth’ (Kuhr's translation in A. Kuhr – S. Sherwin-White, Aspects of Seleucid royal ideology, JHS 111, 1991, 71-86, at 77) should not be too readily brought into the dossier about royal “fortune”. The relevant Akkadian word, dumgu, can be translated in various ways that do not involve the word “fortune”.

perform what is a classic function of Greek military history – and celebrate this as an oriental contribution to western military culture? Or do we stress that the whole point of the story is that a Greek message is (literally) written over the locus of skill that should have belonged to the Babylonian? The consequence is a Hellenic victory over (European) barbarians, so I am fairly sure that the second reading takes precedence. We are, actually, back to the Persian Wars: Greek knew that victory in 480-79 had validated their superiority to barbarians and Macedonians knew that they had inherited and indeed trumped that validation. Whatever might be possible in other areas of culture, this was one where barbarians would always find it hard to make a mark.